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1. Introduction
In this essay, I examine Sartre’s relevance to some issues in contem-
porary philosophy of mind1. Specifically, I argue that Sartre’s devel-
opment of his notion of pre-reflective consciousness can be summoned
to offer a general challenge to contemporary functionalist accounts
of mind, broadly construed. In virtue of the challenge Sartre offers
these contemporary functionalist accounts and the richness of his
phenomenological analysis, I conclude that his voice needs to be
included in ongoing debates over the nature of consciousness. (At
present, Sartre scarcely receives more than a passing reference in
most introductory philosophy of mind anthologies, if he’s men-
tioned at all). Moreover, I argue that Sartre’s model of consciousness
needs to be acknowledged as an alternative to the general functional-
ist views of mind currently dominating Anglo-American debates, as
it rightly resituates embodied and embedded phenomenal conscious-
ness at the center of discussions of mind. However, I conclude the
essay by discussing a way in which Sartre’s notion of prereflective
consciousness is incomplete. I do this by sketching out a way to
enrich Sartre’s still overly-cognitivist notion of pre-reflective con-
sciousness by situating it within the sensorimotor capacities of
embodied action. I demonstrate how this deepened formulation of
prereflective consciousness (rather, a “bodily self-awareness”) is more
consonant with the phenomenology of our lived experience. 
2. Functionalism Defined
I begin by tracing the general contours of a functionalist account of
mind. In his characteristically understated manner, John Searle has
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written that “If you are tempted to functionalism, I believe you do
not need refutation, you need help” (1992: 9). Happily, one does
not have to endorse Searle’s judgment about the psychological well-
being of those drawn to functionalist theories of mind to recognize
some of their limitations. As we’ll see, Sartre’s analysis of the bodily
nature of consciousness is quite helpful in this regard. 
So what is a functionalist account of mind? Simply put, function-
alism—unlike its philosophical ancestor, behaviorism—concedes that
mental states are “inner” or intracranial states of some sort, and that
they are not merely reducible to publicly observable “outer” behav-
ioral states or dispositions to behave in certain ways. (This of course
was the behaviorist gloss of the mental, now very much out of
favor). But functionalism claims that, although different mental
states are inner states, no properties intrinsic to different mental
states individuate them as being the sorts of mental states that they
are. Rather, the relational properties of a given state are actually
what make it the sort of state that it is. In other words, nothing
intrinsic to mental states accounts for the unique “feel” that com-
monsense introspection and the grammar of folk psychology2 seems
to indicate different sorts of mental states as having (e.g., “what its
like” to remember a childhood trip to the circus versus “what its
like” to have a visual experience of a sunset, work out a logical proof,
or drink a single malt scotch). 
In short, functionalism offers an abstract computational character-
ization of mind independent of its neurobiological implementation.
It claims that mental states are individuated by their functional or
causal relations: a state-token’s causal relations to stimulus inputs,
other internal mental states, and behavioral or motor outputs. These
relational properties individuate all mental states. And it is these rela-
tional properties that tell us what a mental state is. Thus, generally
speaking, mental states correspond to functional states—states that
exhibit a certain function within the larger mental economy of a cog-
nitive system. Their distinctive causal role, or their embeddedness
within the larger causal network of other states and the organism’s
patterns of behavior, is what individuates particular mental states and
their properties. Using the experience of pain as an example, Hilary
Putnam (who along with David Armstrong and David Lewis was an
early proponent of functionalism) writes the following:
… pain is not a brain state, in the sense of a physical-chemical state of the
brain (or even the whole nervous system), but another kind of state
entirely. I propose the hypothesis that pain, or the state of being in pain,
is a functional state of the whole organism. ([1967] 1991: 199) 
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To be in pain, according to Putnam, is therefore not simply to be
in a particular mental state that “always lead[s] to one and the same
physical “correlate” of pain” (Putnam [1967] 1991: 201). Nor is it
the experience of being in a certain mental state that possesses an
intrinsic qualitative or subjective property that marks that state as a
pain-feeling state. Rather, a pain-feeling organism is defined as such
by the functional organization of the whole organism: again, the
causal-functional relations of sensory inputs (searing pain of hand
placed on the burner; faint smell of burning flesh), relations to
other states (strong desire to end hand-on-the-burner pain; embar-
rassment of having burnt oneself in front of one’s date), and behav-
ioral outputs (wild flapping of seared hand; rushing to sink to douse
seared hand in water while maintaining some semblance of dignity
in front of date). 
Mental states are thus functional states. And Putnam argued that
they are in this way similar to the logical or functional states of a
computer program (or Turing machine functional states, to be more
precise) (Putnam [1967] 1991: 199). Computer software can be run
on any number of different hardware configurations. Similarly, the
program routines or input-output sequences constitutive of mental-
ity, too, can be instantiated within many different forms of biological
“hardware.” Given this relatively abstract view of mind as constituted
by causal-functional relations, Putnam thus offered the claim that
minds are multiply realizable. On this view, the actual materials mak-
ing up the cognitive system are irrelevant. As long as the materials of
a cognitive system are arranged in the appropriate functional or
causal relations, any appropriately-arranged system can potentially be
conscious (just as it is logically possible to make a functional clock
out of carrots). The mental properties constitutive of consciousness
are not, strictly speaking, therefore necessarily tied to the physical
properties of the brain or any properties intrinsic to mental states.
This consequence of computational functionalism was seen as an
important advancement over the type-identity view of mind-brain
relations, which insisted that mind and brain are one and the same.
Type-identity theorists had faced the difficult problem of having to
deny the logical and metaphysical coherence of the possible existence
of humanlike minds—conscious aliens, silicon-based organisms, AI
constructs—that are nonetheless not identical with humanlike brains.
Computational functionalism purported to offer a characterization of
mentality that did justice to the uniquely inner nature of mind (con-
tra behaviorism) while avoiding the conceptual and metaphysical pit-
falls of identity theories.   
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The above gloss is admittedly painted with broad strokes. And it
is limited to a discussion of one kind of functionalism: Putnam’s
computational functionalism. But it is enough of a story to discern
what critics of functionalism (such as Searle, Block, and Shoemaker,
among others) find perhaps most deficient with this picture of mind.
The deficiency is this: a functionalist account of mind, construed in
this way, seems to leave little (if any) explanatory space for any sort
of intrinsically qualitative element in conscious experience or the
individual mental states constitutive of consciousness. In other
words, the claim is that functionalism purports to provide an account
of mind that leaves out what is perhaps the mind’s most important
feature: what it feels like to actually have a mind.
Two of the more famous arguments against functionalism, the
“inverted spectrum” thought-experiment and the “absent qualia”
problem, highlight this purported deficiency.3 Under the “inverted
spectrum” argument, two subjects can be functionally isomorphic to
one another but enjoy qualitatively inverted color-experiences. Thus
Ray and Rich can be visually experiencing the same tomato, but
while Ray is having a genuine red-sensation, Rich is actually having a
green-sensation (though he terms this sort of green color sensation
“red,” since he doesn’t know any better. Rich has always seen green
where others see red, and thus assumes that his “green” is what
everyone else sees when they speak of “red”). According to func-
tionalism, such a scenario is inconceivable by definition: if two sub-
jects are functionally isomorphic, they are necessarily in the same
mental state. But the critic argues that Rich and Ray’s scenario is
entirely conceivable, and thus functionalism is false. 
Similarly, advocates of the “absent qualia” problem argue that the
relevant functional organization of consciousness can be instantiated
in different physical systems (again, a robot, alien, or the population
of China) but that the “functional states” instantiated by these sys-
tems would surely lack the rich phenomenal feels that individuate
our mental states from one another as we experience them. Surely, the
claim goes, we would not attribute full-blown consciousness to the
population of China as a whole, even if it exhibited the “appropriate”
functional organization to instantiate consciousness. The qualitative
character of experiential states would thus be absent in these cases of
functionally-specified “consciousness.” Both the “inverted spec-
trum” and “absent qualia” objection in this way purports to establish
the possibility of systems or creatures that are functionally identical




The arguments discussed above purport to show that a function-
alist portrayal of consciousness fails to answer the question of why
consciousness feels the way that it does. (The functionalist account
also strikes many counterintuitive—particularly the multiple realiz-
ability thesis, according to which a large grouping of tin cans, for
example, could qualify as conscious, assuming they were arranged in
the appropriate causal-functional configuration—but I leave this
aspect of the discussion aside).4 Put bluntly, critics argue that func-
tionalist theories of mind neglect the essential feature of the mental
that makes consciousness what it is: the intrinsic phenomenal feel of
what it is like to actually be conscious and experiencing. Yet another
way of putting the matter is that the functionalist assimilates the phe-
nomenal (the way consciousness feels) to the causal (what conscious-
ness does as the explanatory basis of behavior), and thus provides
only a one-sided explanation of the mental.5 Of course, many in the
continental philosophical tradition, including Sartre, have long
stressed the need for an account of mind that does justice to the
phenomenal aspect of consciousness experience as lived. But many
functionalists—perhaps fearing that any attempt to preserve the phe-
nomenality of consciousness while conjoining it with a physicalist
account of the mental will necessarily entail an unacceptable dual-
ism—have appeared to critics as all-too-ready to eject the very fea-
ture of consciousness that makes it such a special phenomenon. 
Functionalists, of course, are not without rejoinders to the objec-
tions briefly discussed above. However, the limited scope of this
paper does not encompass a survey of classical arguments for and
against functionalism.6 Rather, I am concerned to develop the
specifically Sartrean challenge that can be levied against all forms of
functionalism, generally construed. Again, functionalism writ large
denies the existence of intrinsic features of experience, instead char-
acterizing mental states in term of their causal-functional roles and
relations. I contend that Sartre argues to the contrary for at least
one necessarily intrinsic feature of experience: prereflective con-
sciousness. Therefore, this important notion—so very critical to
Sartre’s phenomenological ontology of consciousness developed
within Being and Nothingness—can be summoned against general
functionalist accounts of mentality.
I would now like to develop this last claim more carefully by uti-
lizing Sartre’s notion of prereflective consciousness. Specifically, I
will argue that pre-reflective consciousness is an intrinsic feature of
all conscious experience that (1) individuates different mental states
without appealing to their causal-functional basis, and that it is
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furthermore (2) a feature of experience that provides, at least par-
tially, the basis for the phenomenal aspect of consciousness (again,
without appealing to casual-functional explanation).  
3. Sartre on Prereflective Consciousness
In Being and Nothingness, Sartre distinguishes pre-reflective conscious-
ness from reflective consciousness. Reflective consciousness, Sartre
argues, is an act of consciousness in which consciousness deliberately
turns back on itself and “the reflecting consciousness posits the con-
sciousness reflected on, as its object” (1956: 12). Yet this reflexive
“self-objectifying” movement of consciousness is a founded mode of
consciousness, according to Sartre. Reflective consciousness arises
from a more primitive pre-reflective self-consciousness. And reflec-
tive consciousness is therefore a secondary or derivative act, founded
in this pre-reflective consciousness. For in order to avoid an infinite
regress of potentially self-reflexive acts (“I am aware that I am cold,”
and “I am aware that I am aware that I am cold,” and “I am aware
that I am aware that I am aware that I am cold,” ad infinitum),
Sartre contends that there must be a point at which consciousness
cannot turn upon itself and take itself (and its acts and their con-
tents) as objects. The standpoint of pre-reflective consciousness is
just this terminal or bedrock point. Pre-reflective consciousness thus
makes possible reflective consciousness (Wider, 1997: 45). Sartre
argues that “every positional consciousness of an object is at the
same time a non-positional [or pre-reflective] consciousness of itself”
(1956: 13). And this pre-reflective self-consciousness, as an intrinsic
feature of all conscious experience, needs to be considered “not as a
new consciousness, but as the only mode of existence which is possible
for a consciousness of something” (1956: 14). 
The kernel of Sartre’s discussion most salient to our present con-
cerns is the claim that even pre-reflective consciousness—which is
the bare consciousness of something other than itself (i.e., an object
of which it is conscious)—is self-aware. According to Sartre pre-
reflective consciousness is a mode of self-awareness in which con-
sciousness, as aware of an object, is simultaneously aware of not
being that object of which it is aware. This awareness of not being
that of which it is aware—again, the specific object of an act of con-
sciousness—is a primitive self-awareness, Sartre contends. It is an
intrinsic feature of all experience. And therefore even pre-reflective
consciousness, which grounds reflective consciousness and is thus
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the primal level of consciousness, exhibits self-awareness. Put simply,
consciousness is self-aware all the way down. (This understanding is
what motivates Sartre’s larger well-known claim concerning the
absolute translucency of consciousness). If this prereflective con-
sciousness were not operative in all conscious acts, Sartre contends,
consciousness could conceivably be conscious of an object without
being conscious of itself as conscious of an object—rendering an
unconscious consciousness—which he insists is a patent absurdity,
logically and phenomenologically incoherent. Thus this implicit self-
awareness is an irreducible feature of all conscious experience,
according to Sartre. It is both a logical as well as phenomenological
feature of consciousness, and individuates mental states without
recourse to their causal-functional origins. Thus it is an intrinsic fea-
ture of experience that eludes functional explication. The claim will
be developed more fully in a moment. 
A brief tangent here. Sartre is not the only prominent thinker to
argue for a primitive self-awareness as an intrinsic feature of all con-
scious experience. Kant offers a somewhat similar (though certainly
less developed) understanding of primitive self-awareness as that
found in Sartre. Like Sartre, Kant claims that simply recognizing an
object of consciousness is sufficient for recognizing that I am recog-
nizing an object, that I am aware of the experience as mine. This
implicit self-awareness in the Critique of Pure Reason is referred to as
a kind of “pure self-consciousness”:
Thus the subject of the categories cannot, by thinking them, obtain a
concept of itself as an object of the categories; for in order to think them,
it must take its pure self-consciousness, which is just what is to be
explained, as its ground. (B422)
By designating this form of self-awareness as “pure,” Kant antici-
pates Sartre in arguing that this bedrock or primitive self-awareness
cannot take itself as an object. Rather, it is the condition of possibil-
ity for taking anything as an object of experience.7 Thus Kant’s
“pure self-consciousness,” a primitive self-awareness that accompa-
nies all conscious experience, is not an object of reflective conscious-
ness: “Now it is indeed very illuminating that I cannot cognize as an
object itself that which I must presuppose in order to cognize an
object at all” (A402).8
To return to the main thread of the argument: I have argued that
all consciousness, according to both Kant and Sartre—and pace func-
tionalism—harbors a primitive self-referentiality as an intrinsic feature
of experience. Importantly, this implicit self-awareness is both a logi-
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cal as well as phenomenological feature of experience that is indepen-
dent of causal-functional explanations. In assimilating the phenome-
nal to the causal-functional, functionalism mistakenly ignores this
intrinsic feature of experience. Thus functionalism overlooks an essen-
tial feature of the mental and is explanatorily inadequate.  
But what about the phenomenal aspect of conscious experience?
Can Sartre’s notion of pre-reflective consciousness contribute an
explanation of the qualitative feel that, according to common sense,
would seem to individuate different mental states? And can it
demonstrate that functionalism’s jettisoning of this phenomenal feel
of consciousness is misguided? I suggest that it can. The argument
goes like this. Sartre’s implicit self-awareness (or pre-reflective con-
sciousness) founds the intrinsic phenomenality of mental states. It
does so in the following way. Within an occurrent mental state there
is an irreducible “givenness” that somehow marks it as my own. That
is, this irreducible givenness is the first-personal presentation of an
experience to me. And while a possible object of experience can
appear for multiple subjects—a red apple, for example, is intersubjec-
tively accessible in that it can perceptually present itself to others,
each assuming a different phenomenological vantage-point—the
first-personal givenness of my experience of an object is given only to
me. Therefore, these first-personal experiences are characterized by
their phenomenal quality that tells me “what it is like” to have a par-
ticular experience—and most importantly, tells me “what it is like”
for me to have a given experience from my phenomenological perspec-
tive. (This notion of “phenomenological perspective” is important,
and will be discussed more in a moment). Furthermore, it is because
of this subjective feel of this first-personal givenness that we can
speak sensibly of what it is like for another person to have their own
unique experience of a tree, a childhood memory, or a pleasantly
smoky single malt scotch. We understand the reports of others who
claim to have had similar experiences because we are able to set them
next to our own immediate awareness of the first-person “feel” of
having had similar experiences ourselves.9
Generalizing from this, we can say that there is something that it’s
like to have such experiences because there’s something that it’s like
to be pre-reflectively self-aware and to have such experiences. While
redness is a property of the perceived apple—the thing “out there”
in the world, so to speak—the self-manifestation of the redness of
the apple in my individual experience of it is not. Therefore there is
an intrinsic feature of experience that is not reducible to the objects
of our experience. And this irreducible feature, how the redness of
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the apple manifests itself specifically to me, as a self-aware experiencing
subject embodying a particular phenomenological perspective, deals not
with properties of objects of consciousness but rather with intrinsic
properties of an experience given with a first-personal immediacy to
me, a self-aware experiencing subject. Thus there are properties
intrinsic to the presence or mode of presentation of objects—specifi-
cally, in their first-personal immediacy, their immediate givenness to
me via a particular mode of presentation (such as seeing, hearing,
tasting, smelling, touching, etc.)—which exist apart from intentional
objects and our causal-functional relations with them. These intrinsic
properties of experience resist tidy functional explanation.
There is a bit of a wrinkle, however. It might be objected that I
have provided an overly subjectivist rendering of Sartre’s account of
phenomenal qualities of experience.10 In other words, the objection
goes like this. For Sartre, consciousness is literally nothing. It is utter
translucency, emptiness. Thus, whatever content consciousness has—
including intentional objects, such as a red apple—is not, strictly
speaking, in consciousness. For there is nothing for conscious con-
tent to be in, in the first place! Again, consciousness is emptiness.
Therefore, to posit the notion of an intrinsic feature of experience,
or a phenomenal property of consciousness somehow intrinsic to
conscious states, is to miss Sartre’s point entirely. For according to
Sartre, all properties of consciousness, including phenomenal prop-
erties or subjective qualities of experience, are rather really qualities
of the world “out there”: the things and states of affairs, in them-
selves, towards which consciousness is directed. Consciousness is lit-
erally nothing over against the transcendent objects that it reveals. It
has no being and no content other than its fundamental openness or
directedness (the various modes of its intentional relationships) that
disclose transcendent objects of consciousness as being for the partic-
ular experience of a conscious subject. But consciousness is nothing
beyond this fundamental openness or world-directedness. And once
more, whatever properties the things and states of affairs of the
world are experienced as having are intrinsic to the things and states
of affairs themselves, not consciousness. This radical reversal of ideal-
ism—where the content of consciousness, including its phenomenal
or subjective qualities, are out in the world—is perhaps Sartre’s
sharpest point of divergence from both Kant and Husserl’s egologi-
cal models of consciousness. 
Several salient quotes from Being and Nothingness seem to sup-
port this objection. For example, Sartre writes that “Too often, qual-
ity has been conceived as a simple subjective determination, and its
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quality-of-being has then been confused with the subjectivity of the
psychic” (1956: 257). Against this subjectivist or representationalist
rendering of perception, Sartre insists that “the yellow of the lemon
is not a subjective mode of apprehending the lemon; it is the lemon”
(1956: 257); and later: “The odor which I breathe in … even before
I have referred to it an odorous object, is already an odor-being and
not a subjective impression” (1956: 259). Thus, a perceptual quality,
such as redness, yellowness, or odorousness “can indeed appear to a
subjectivity, but it can not be inserted in the woof of that subjectiv-
ity …” (1956: 259). In other words, whatever phenomenal or sub-
jective qualities we experience are qualities that inhere in the objects
themselves, and not within some sort of inner mental realm housing
ideas or representations of theses qualities. All appearances of things
and states of affairs to consciousness—yellow lemons, red apples,
odorous smells slithering in through an open window—are thus
transcendent, nonmental entities.11
Yet we nevertheless experience phenomenal appearances with an
immediate, noninferential, first-person givenness that gives phe-
nomenal qualities an “absolute proximity” to us, an “absolute prox-
imity … without either giving or refusing itself” (1956: 259). Sartre
then adds that this absolute first-person proximity nonetheless
“implies a distance” (1956: 259). Thus, “sense quality is a presence
perpetually out of reach” (1956: 258). Elaborating this phenomenal
tension, he continues:  
Quality is the indication of what we are not and of the mode of being
which is denied to us. The perception of white is the consciousness of the
impossibility on principle for the For-itself to exist as color—that is, by
being what it is. (1956: 259)
If someone should ask now how it happens that the “this” has qualities
we should reply that actually the this is released as a totality on the
ground of the world and that it is given as an undifferentiated unity. It is
the for-itself which can deny itself from various points of view [my empha-
sis] when confronting the this … For each negating act by which the free-
dom of the For-itself spontaneously constitutes its being, there is a
corresponding total revelation of being “in profile”… [which] is nothing
but a relation of the thing to the For-itself, a relation realized by the For-
itself. (1956: 259)
The water is especially murky here, so let’s begin simply. There
are number of interesting consequences of Sartre’s view of con-
sciousness developed in the above remarks. For one, Sartre insists
that, since nothing is actually in consciousness, there is no ontologi-
cal basis for positing the existence of inner ideas, impressions, repre-
sentations, or sense data that serve as the true objects of experience.
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Rather, in an occurrent experience, we have direct, unmediated and
noninferential access to the things and states of affairs that we take
ourselves to be experiencing. Consciousness, as a fundamental
world-directed openness, is directed out towards real things in the
world, as they are in themselves. Sartre thus affirms a theory of
direct perception. 
Additionally, it seems as though for Sartre all features of con-
sciousness—including its phenomenal properties—are actually fea-
tures of the world (and things in it) toward which consciousness is
directed. Put simply, the feels of consciousness are actually distrib-
uted across the objects themselves. The phenomenal feels of “yellow-
ness” and “sourness” are features of the lemon, and not “inner”
features of consciousness. But how is this so? How can all conscious-
ness be self-conscious (an “absolute proximity”) and yet at the same
time be utterly empty of content—including phenomenal properties?   
Again, Sartre’s reconciliation of these tensions is not particularly
clear. In a moment, I’ll spell out how I think these tensions in fact
can be reconciled—though my solution is not one we find suffi-
ciently developed in Sartre. To understand Sartre’s view here, recall
that every act of consciousness, for Sartre, consists of a negation of
consciousness in the face of that towards which consciousness is
directed. Consciousness is always negated by that which it is not.
This is consciousness “deny[ing] itself … when confronting the this”
(1956: 259), where “the this” is that of which consciousness is
aware. And it is in this self-negation that consciousness “sponta-
neously constitutes its being” (1956: 259). A logical and phenome-
nological feature of this self-negation, then, is pre-reflective
self-awareness: a tacit self-awareness that, at each moment of experi-
ence, affirms that I am not that which I am currently aware of. This
holds for phenomenal properties, too. For though I am aware of the
yellowness and the sourness of the lemon—and moreover, pre-
reflectively aware that this yellowness and sourness, as experienced,
is my phenomenal experience given immediately to me—I am simul-
taneously aware that that the lemon itself possesses these same quali-
ties. These qualities are “released” by the lemon for me. But they are
phenomenal properties that nonetheless do not exist in me (in any
sort of intramental representation, sense data, etc.) but are rather
qualities of the lemon in-itself. 
Is this enough? Does this rendering offer an adequate account of
how preflective self-awareness can both be an intrinsic feature of 
all conscious states and, at the same time, preserve their phenome-
nality without importing some sort of problematic intramental
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entity (representations, sense data, ideas, impression, etc.) within
which phenomenal qualities are purportedly realized? It’s not clear
that it does. In the next section, I discuss a manner in which some
of the tensions and difficulties in Sartre’s view might be untangled
and clarified.
4. Back to the Body: Broadening Sartre’s Notion 
of Prereflective Consciousness
In this final section, I would like to offer a way in which Sartre’s
notion of pre-reflective consciousness might be improved. Specif-
ically, I argue that by deepening the notion of pre-reflective
consciousness to encompass the sensorimotor structures of our
world-engaged embodied action—and furthermore acknowledging
that these sensorimotor capacities and bodily skills also harbor an
implicit self-awareness—we accomplish two things. First, we provide
an account of self-awareness more consonant with the phenomenol-
ogy of our embodied coping, and clarify some of the conceptual and
phenomenological difficulties referenced in the previous section.
Secondly, we have sharpened the manner in which this notion can be
summoned as a critique of functionalism.
I will be brief here. My basic criticism in this final section might
strike some as a tad ironic. Namely, I argue that Sartre, noted
philosopher of the body, fails to take seriously enough the relation-
ship between his central claims that all consciousness is (1) embodied
and (2) self-aware. While he emphasizes at length this latter feature
of consciousness (its self-awareness), his formulation of how con-
sciousness is self-aware “all the way down” (which I’ve been dis-
cussing in the prior sections) neglects several crucial aspects of the
way that an embodied consciousness engages with its world as a bod-
ily subject. Thus his notion of pre-reflective consciousness remains
overly-cognitivist, and needs to be extended to encompass pre-reflec-
tive bodily skills (possibilities for action and movement) and the
implicit self-awareness that is part of their basic structure.12
Admittedly, Sartre is not totally silent on the idea of bodily self-
awareness. Part 3 of Being and Nothingness contains his most explicit
consideration of the lived body: the body-subject, as opposed to my
body experienced as an object for another, which is an alienation
from the more basic experience of my body-as-subject. He writes
that “because the body is the point of view on which there cannot be
a point of view … the body belongs then to the structures of the 
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non-thetic self-consciousness” (1956: 434). Yet Sartre immediately
qualifies this claim by arguing that the body cannot be identified
“purely and simply” with non-thetic consciousness (1956: 434).
For “non-thetic self-consciousness is self-consciousness as the free
project towards a possibility which is its own; that is, in so far as it is
the foundation of its own nothingness” (1956: 434). And thus
“Non-positional consciousness is consciousness (of the) body as
being that which it surmounts and nihilates by making itself con-
sciousness—i.e., as being something which consciousness … passes
over in being what it had to be. In short, consciousness (of) the
body is lateral and retrospective; the body is the neglected, the
“passed by in silence” (1956: 434). 
Again, Sartre is a bit difficult here. But it seems that his claim is
the body—or more precisely, our basic self-awareness of ourselves as
embodied within a world—is what both discloses the fact that con-
sciousness exists as embodied in its world, as well as being that which
must be “nihilated” for consciousness to become aware of the world
in which it is embodied. Bodily self-awareness at this basic level is
only present by its absence (once it is nihilated by the upsurge of con-
sciousness into the world). In other words, my body opens up the
world as an arena of potential action and movement, but to realize
these bodily potentials, I must inhabit or “live-through” my body so
transparently that it fades to pure absence while I live, act, and move
within the world.      
Sartre’s position harbors some important phenomenological
insights into the prereflective structure of bodily action and clearly
anticipates some of Merleau-Ponty’s later related insights. However,
I think Sartre’s more general approach here is mistaken. Briefly,
here’s why. When I have an experience of the world (say, looking at
a rose bush in my garden), the content of my experience always pre-
sents itself from a particular phenomenal perspective or vantage
point. (Recall Sartre’s earlier point that “It is the for-itself which can
deny itself from various points of view [my emphasis] when con-
fronting the this” (1956: 259). This perspectival aspect of the con-
tent of my experience is specified by where I am in relation to the
object of my experience. It also specified by where I could possibly
be, if I decide to take three steps to the left, for instance. But this
relation to the objects of my experience—a spatial relation—is speci-
fied by my bodily relation to these objects (e.g. the direction of the
sound of a car suddenly backfiring is specified in relation to my
body, and I become aware of it as “slightly behind me and to my
left”; the rose bush is seen as “directly in front of me”). This
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perspectival self-awareness is a bodily self-awareness that is operative
without conceptual or reflective articulation. It is an implicit self-
awareness, but not simply a cognitive self-awareness, or a matter of
the for-itself taking up a perspective on the world. It is first and fore-
most a bodily self-awareness. In other words, it is a proprioceptive
self-awareness of the body’s potential for action and movement.13
Thus the orientational structure of my perceptual field always har-
bors an implicit self-referentiality to the embodied perspective I take
on the world and the experiences I have of the things in it from this
embodied perspective. The content of my experience is coupled to
the fact of my embodied agency: my potential for action and move-
ment. Importantly, once more, this bodily self-referentiality is not
equivalent to a higher-order cognitive self-reflexivity, however, but is
in fact more phenomenologically basic. (And thus we can also speak
of certain animals as enjoying this bodily self-referentiality). The
roses look a certain way to me from here, where “here” denotes a
specific spatial relationship to the roses that I have in virtue of where
I am presently standing. Sartre’s overly-mentalist formulation of pre-
reflective consciousness thus overlooks the extent to which my body
inhabits this “egocentric space” (as Gareth Evans [1982] refers to it)
that I am here describing. Furthermore, this “egocentric space” not
only refers to my present spatial relationship with respect to the
object of my experience, but moreover to any potential bodily per-
spectives I might assume (leaning over the top of bush, lying on my
back beneath it, kneeling behind it), based upon having a body with
the specific sensorimotor capacities and bodily skills that afford possi-
bilities of movement and action. This self-awareness of my being a
“biological body” that stands in a determinate (but malleable) per-
spectival relation with the objects of my experience is part of the
basic structure of every experience—and it exists prior to my cogni-
tive self-consciousness. Yet Sartre says little of our “biological body”
and its generation of this “egocentric space”—through actions and
movements both realized and implicitly recognized as possible, given
the constraints of changing action-contexts—as I’ve described these
features of our experience. Even if a more focused consideration of
our “biological” body does not fit into Sartre’s immediate phenome-
nological concerns (as he might respond to my charge), such a con-
sideration would nonetheless certainly help to fill out a more robust
account of the structure of our embodied agency in the world when
coupled with Sartre’s phenomenological investigations. One can
acknowledge the contributions rendered by a consideration of our
“biological” body without collapsing the biological body’s lived
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phenomenology back into a purely materialist account of conscious-
ness. But Sartre’s insistence on the rigid ontological division
between the subject-body (its phenomenology) and body-as-object-
for another (its physical or “biological” aspects) seemingly precludes
this dual consideration of embodied consciousness. 
Of course, this final criticism does not in any way lessen Sartre’s
relevance to contemporary philosophy of mind. Establishing this
final point was perhaps this paper’s foremost goal. If anything, the
discussion which emerged from Sartre’s views—including its short-
comings—only serves to reaffirm his immediate significance to
ongoing discussions of the nature of embodied consciousness and
experience. And Sartre’s important reflections on consciousness
thus deserve a readership more concerned with exploring the mys-
teries of consciousness as lived than with preserving analytical and
continental methods as allegedly autonomous and self-sufficient
approaches to mind.
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Notes
1 . Many thanks to Steve Hendley for helpful comments on and discussion of an ear-
lier draft of this essay. Thanks also to two anonymous reviewers for their insight-
ful suggestions.
2. In the philosophy of mind and cognitive science literature, “folk psychology”
refers to the pre-philosophical views the lay person has about the nature of the
mind and mental states, most notably those having to do with the prediction and
explanation of behavior. Examples include beliefs like mental states are inner phe-
nomena, damaging a particular part of the body causes pain in that area and peo-
ple who are angry frown. 
3. See Ned Block’s “Troubles with Functionalism,” in Block (1980) for a discussion
of these objections.
4. For an extended discussion and criticism of the multiple realizability thesis, see
Shapiro (2004).
5. David Chalmers (1996) makes this same point. See pgs. 11–16.
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6. For responses to the inverted spectrum and absent qualia arguments, see Dennett
(1978), Van Gulick (1989), and Shoemaker (1994). 
7. For a further discussion of both Sartre and Kant on this issue (including some
important points of divergence not here considered), see Wider (1997). For a
more extended consideration of Kant’s understanding of transcendental self-
awareness, see Brook (1994).   
8. For the sake of clarification, it is important to note that Sartre does part with
Kant in some important ways concerning the larger significance of prereflective
consciousness for understanding mind and experience. Indeed, in The Transcen-
dence of the Ego: An Existentialist Theory of Consciousness (1960), Sartre offers an
extended critique of the transcendental commitments of both Kant’s and, espe-
cially, Husserl’s ego-logical approaches to consciousness. (Transcendence of the
Ego is, of course, largely directed at Husserl). Therefore, it is important not to
overstate the affinities between the three men on this point. Once more, how-
ever, to venture too far astray here would take us into complicated but important
interpretive terrain not directly relevant to present concerns. My claim here is
simply that Kant and Sartre—despite their substantive differences—both draw
attention to what Sartre terms “pre-reflective consciousness” as a necessarily
intrinsic feature of all experience. See Mensch (2001) for an analysis of Husserl’s
similar thoughts on this issue.
9. See Zahavi (1999) for an extended analysis the various modes of self-awareness,
including prereflective self-awareness, informing consciousness and experience.
Zahavi’s careful analysis was very helpful in motivating the arguments of this
paper. 
10. This important objection was brought to my attention by an anonymous reviewer
of this essay.
11. These and other quotes seem to cast Sartre as something of an externalist—and
there is probably something to this. For an interesting elaboration of Sartre’s
view here and its relation to contemporary externalist views of mind, see Row-
lands (2003). 
12. The argument in this section is very much influenced by Alva Noë’s sensorimo-
tor-based enactive account of consciousness in Noë (2004).
13. There is empirical support, culled from recent research in developmental psychol-
ogy, for thinking that a proprioceptive self-awareness of this sort is present from
birth. See in particular Meltzoff and Moore (1977), Meltzoff (2005), and Gal-
lagher (2005), especially chapter 3.  
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